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Abstract 
There is a significant and growing body of literature that considers how Universities might act as a 
catalyst in fostering sustainability from the perspectives of management and administration, promoting 
research into sustainability issues and developing curricula that enables students to acquire 
‘environmental literacy’ and to explore sustainability values. However, an emergent theme in the 
international research is that, “Universities, expected to be at the cutting edge of thought and practice, 
are behind the curve on this trend – far behind”.  Focusing upon curriculum development, many 
Universities around the world have considered how programmes of study might adequately equip 
students to develop the necessary literacy that would enable them to explore present and future 
concepts of sustainability in its many guises. In certain forms this has included mandatory 
requirements; students must take particular papers or must include a set numbers of select papers 
within their degree structure regardless of the subject of their major.  The present paper analyses this 
approach from within a legal and jurisprudential framework. The first question to be addressed is 
whether Universities should promote ‘environmental literacy’ to all students. Much of the existing 
literature automatically assumes that this is invariably ‘a good thing’ but certain factions in society 
would counter-argue that particular philosophies should not be imposed upon all. In addressing this 
initial hurdle the paper considers whether ‘environmental literacy’ addressing concepts of sustainability 
should be afforded privileged treatment in tertiary education. Thereafter, using New Zealand as a case 
study, consideration is given to the interplay between Universities role as ‘critic and conscience of the 
nation’ and academic freedom (prescribed by Education Acts) and how various curriculum initiatives fit 
within these concepts. The concept of academic freedom for students is an important consideration 
and laws guaranteeing human rights might be pertinent in assessing the validity of mandatory courses 
or components of programmes. The paper considers whether compulsory courses or programmes 
transgress academic freedom or flout legal rights. 
Keywords: law, jurisprudence, 'environmental literacy', sustainability, mandatory papers, academic 
freedom. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
If we are to safeguard the health of the environment for present and future generations, the leaders 
and policy makers of the future have to be educated in a radically different way to their forbearers. 
This conclusion has been reached, and is being advanced, not only by individual academics
i
 but by 
international organizations and university leaders from around the world. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has declared that “[e]ducation, in short, is humanity’s 
best hope and most effective means to the quest to achieve sustainable development”
ii
 and to date 
423 presidents, rectors, and vice chancellors of universities from all regions of the world have signed 
the Talloires Declaration confirming that university leaders “are deeply concerned about the 
unprecedented scale and speed of environmental pollution and degradation, and the depletion of 
natural resources”.  As a consequence, those leaders have agreed to “Foster Environmental Literacy 
For All [and to] create programs to develop the capability of university faculty to teach environmental 
literacy to all undergraduate, graduate and professional students”.
 iii
 Such concerns and commitments 
have been echoed in a number of other international agreements
iv
and evince a promise to reform 
education to equip all students with the critical thinking skills necessary to meet the challenges of a 
marginal environment.  Clearly, curricula development will be an important factor in achieving this 
goal.  This paper considers whether universities could, from a legal and jurisprudential basis, require 
all students to take papers that would educate them as to such issues and further, whether 
Universities should.  It will use New Zealand as a case study primarily because whilst one might 
expect New Zealand universities to be at the “cutting edge of thought and practice, [they] are behind 
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the curve on this trend – far behind”
v
 and there is growing pressure for reform from both within 
universities and externally.
vi
 At the outset, the author should declare that it is not her intention to enter 
the debate as to whether such a mandatory paper ought, as a preference, address ‘sustainable 
development’ or ‘ecology or ‘environmental literacy’ although she has chosen to refer to 
‘environmental literacy’ in order to render the arguments less amorphous 
2 JUSTIFYING MANDATORY PAPERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITERACY 
Many academics have justified the introduction of mandatory papers addressing environmental 
literacy (or sustainability) from a moral perspective arguing that such measures are becoming 
necessary in order to safeguard the earth for the wellbeing of present and future generations.
vii
 Critics 
on the other hand have challenged such suggestions by accusing the proponents of pushing their own 
political agendas.  They argue that to allow an elite, or even a misguide majority, to impose their 
preferences on others has proved disastrous throughout history (Nazi-ism or the Taliban’s version of 
Islam provide examples) and is an inherent threat to fundamental liberties.  There is little scope for 
common ground between such polarised camps but it is possible to adopt a jurisprudential approach 
to this question.  In contrast to Nazi-ism, for example, the imperatives of environmental protection and 
restoration are well established in international law.  There are numerous treaties, soft law political 
declarations and United Nations General Assembly resolutions that address various facets of 
environmental protection.  Many treaties have almost universal state support.
viii
 In addition, one can 
trace the flow of this international law down into regional agreements and further into the constitutions 
and / or domestic law of most states. Whilst existing international law does not comprehensively 
protect all parts of the natural environment, the importance of environmental protection is clearly 
evidenced in this sphere. Given Universities role as a critic and conscience of society
ix
, academics 
should be vigilant in ensuring state compliance with these laws and should equip their students as 
citizens to do likewise.  There is a clear pedagogical reason for including environmental literacy 
programmes in the curriculum and from a jurisprudential basis Universities would have a valid basis 
for including mandatory environmental literacy papers in degree programmes.  The question may arise 
however as to why preference should be given to environmental literacy as opposed to, for example, 
insisting that students learn principles of equality and justice or human rights.  Such ideals are also 
protected by numerous international and domestic laws.  Similar justifications would apply to those 
already proffered in relation to environmental literacy papers.  A University may well decide to 
prioritise human rights issues by imposing mandatory requirements and that decision could also be 
justified on a jurisprudential basis.  It must be acknowledged that the fact that other ideals are 
deserving of particular attention will make decision-making for the particular university more difficult 
x
but it does not undermine the jurisprudential basis for mandatory environmental literacy papers.  If a 
University decides to prioritise environmental literacy, it can be justified, jurisprudentially, for doing so.  
Another important point needs to be addressed.  Pressures to reform tertiary education may come 
from within the institution itself or may come from external bodies.  In addressing the issue of 
mandatory papers, it is important to consider the source of the pressure for reform.  If universities 
themselves decide to introduce mandatory papers, the focus of legal legitimacy will be upon the 
relationship between the student and the university.  If however, the state or other external bodies 
seek to control or manage universities curricula either directly or through the provisions of targeted 
funding, the focus of the inquiry must be upon the relationship between the university and those 
external bodies.  This latter scenario, whilst proving interesting and raising numerous complexities is 
not the subject of this short paper.  Accordingly, the following discussion will focus upon the status of 
students to influence or challenge the decision of a University to impose mandatory papers.    
3 COULD STUDENTS LEGALLY CHALLENGE THE IMPOSITION OF 
MANDATORY ENVIRONMENTAL LITERACY PAPERS? 
It is not impossible to imagine a scenario whereby a student or body of students is unhappy with any 
mandatory requirements.  Whilst many degrees have mandatory paper requirements, mandatory 
papers that are unrelated to a chosen discipline may add to the expense or length of time taken to 
complete a degree.  Students may have philosophical objections to undertaking papers concerning 
environmental issues or may simply object to the university dictating what extraneous papers they 
must take.  If internal negotiations between students and the university foundered, would students be 
able to legally challenge the imposition of the mandatory papers? 
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3.1 Judicial Involvement in Students’ Disputes with Universities 
Traditionally, courts in common law jurisdictions have been reluctant to interfere in disputes between 
students and universities but that is not to say that they will not do so in appropriate circumstances.  
The legal relationship between a fee-paying student and a university may be both contractual and, 
depending upon the legal form taken by the University, governed by public law principles.
xi
  The Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales has addressed the special circumstances occasioned by student-
university disputes in the case of Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside.
xii
  In his 
judgment, Lord Woolf MR stated that, “A university is a public body … [g]rievances against universities 
are preferably resolved within the grievance procedure which the universities have today.  If they 
cannot be resolved in that way, where there is a visitor, they then have to be resolved by the visitor
xiii
 
(except in exceptional circumstances).  The courts will not usually intervene.  While the courts will 
intervene when there is no visitor this should normally happen after the student has made use of the 
domestic procedures for resolving the dispute.  If it is not possible to resolve the dispute internally, and 
there is no visitor, then the courts may have no alternative but to become involved.  If they do so, the 
preferable procedure would usually be by way of judicial review.  If on the other hand, the proceedings 
are based on the contract between the student and the university then they do not have to be brought 
by way of judicial review.”
xiv
 Thus, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the courts could as a last resort 
intervene in disputes between students and universities.  Alleged breaches of contract may be 
justiciable by the courts in appropriate circumstances but the preferable route to challenge is via 
judicial review of the decision made by the public body.
xv
  
Would the decision of a university to require all students to take mandatory environmental literacy 
papers be justiciable by the courts or not?Clearly, a student would have difficulty arguing breach of 
contract if there had been clear written notice of the requirement at the time she enrolled and in those 
circumstances any court based challenge would have to rely upon judicial review.   
3.2 Judicial Review 
In its simplest terms, a court in a common law jurisdiction will review a decision made by a public body 
if that body abuses its statutory powers.  In New Zealand, and in common with a number of other 
jurisdictions, the Court may review a decision if the public body acted outside the ambit of the statute 
conferring the power, came to a decision in a manner that was procedurally unfair or if the body acted 
unreasonably in the exercise of that power.  In general, the thresholds for successful review of 
administrative decisions are set purposefully high because judges are not politicians or policy makers 
and accordingly, it is not the judicial role to replace a valid administrative decision with one the court 
would have particularly favoured.  When consideration is given to cases concerning the decisions of 
Universities, the bar for intervention appears to be raised even further.  One example relates to 
procedural fairness; all of the usual demonstrations of procedural fairness may not be required in 
cases concerning academic judgement.  In R v Higher Education Funding Council,
xvi
 another English 
case, the court found that it would not automatically amount to procedural unfairness (and therefore a 
ground for review) if reasons were not given to explain an academic judgement.  Academic 
judgement, or rather a judgement exercised for pedagogical reasons, appears to attract a special 
protection from judicial scrutiny.   
Returning to the imposition of a mandatory environmental literacy paper, it is difficult to envisage a 
scenario whereby the University would have acted outside the ambit of its statutory powers unless it 
was regulated by an unusual, highly prescriptive statute.  Further, if a university followed all 
appropriate internal procedures for introducing a mandatory paper, it would be difficult to challenge the 
decision on the basis of procedural impropriety.  The major remaining ground for review would be a 
challenge to the reasonableness or otherwise of the decision or academic judgement.  Whilst the 
Court of Appeal in Clark initially stated that, “ the court will not involve itself with issues that involve 
making academic judgements”, it seemed to leave open the prospect of reviewing a substantive 
decision in some cases by refining that comprehensive statement: “there are issues of academic or 
pastoral judgement which the university is equipped to consider in breadth and depth, but on which 
any judgement of the courts would be jejune and inappropriate”.
xvii
 There can however be little doubt 
that such incidents would be rare.  
It is entirely foreseeable, particularly given the discussion in section 2 above, that a University would 
be able to justify environmental literacy papers as part of the curriculum.  Any challenge would be to 
the universality of the requirement.  How would a student challenge the reasonableness of the 
imposition?  Might a student argue that the decision to impose a mandatory environmental literacy 
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paper upon them breached their rights to academic freedom?  To answer this question requires some 
examination as to the meaning of academic freedom and specific consideration as to whether 
students can claim a right to that freedom. 
4 ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR STUDENTS AS A HISTORICAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSTRUCT 
As a philosophical idea what then does the concept of academic freedom connote?  Does academic 
freedom incorporate both the freedom to teach and the freedom to learn and, rather than granting a 
privilege to an elite group in society, does academic freedom imply a right to all to pursue free 
academic endeavours?  The historical origins of the idea suggest a coming together of the diverse 
concepts of privilege and universal rights.
xviii
  Conrad Russell writes that academic freedom originated 
from ecclesiastical privileges.
 xix
  The elite of the medieval Catholic Church were protected by papal 
degrees against the vagaries of the monarchs and in an effort to resist state intervention into its affairs 
the Church naturally extended ecclesiastical privileges to the church-established Universities.  One 
suspects however that the need for inculcation with the teaching of the Church lead to a situation far 
removed from our present understanding of academic freedom.  A clear break from the ecclesiastical 
privileges came with Campanella’s defence of Galileo (1622) and his argument in support of libertas 
philosophandi.
xx
  This plea for liberty was used to protect individual academics but by the eighteenth 
century the German research-orientated Universities of Halle-Wittenberg and Gottingen had firmly 
established concepts of libertas philosophandi that underpinned the entire research endeavours of the 
institution.
xxi
  Importantly, the concept achieved greater definition within the era of Humboldt when 
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit (the freedom to teach and to learn) became the hallmarks of the German 
Universities.
 xxii
 Might one argue that, from this point on, student academic endeavours fell within the 
general protection afforded by academic freedom?
xxiii
  
In a parallel development, a wider human rights-based approach to freedom of expression can be 
traced back to works such as Milton’s Areogapagitica and Mill’s On Liberty.
xxiv
  With modern day 
hindsight, the universal right of free expression provides a clear and equitable justification for 
academic freedom as a valid subset of this right and removes it from the category of privilege for an 
elite group.  The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that academic freedom is a “special 
concern of the First Amendment” that is, the constitutional right to free speech that applies to all 
citizens.
xxv
 Certainly, adopting a rights based approach lends greater credence to the interpretation of 
academic freedom as encompassing both the freedoms of academia and students.  
Today, a proliferation of soft-law, political declarations support the notion that academic freedom 
extends to students. The Lima Declaration states that, “all students of higher education shall enjoy 
freedom of study, including the right to choose the field of study from available courses”
xxvi
 and the 
Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students reflects a similar position in paragraph 1 on 
Protection of Freedom of Expression, “Students should be free to take reasoned exception to the data 
or views offered in any course of study and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion, but they are 
responsible for learning the content of any course of study for which they are enrolled”.
xxvii
 Modern 
pedagogues often point to the inseparable nature of teaching and learning; academics are continually 
learning and it would be an ineffective professor indeed who decried the contribution that student 
insights might make to their own professorial knowledge or even the subject as a whole
xxviii
. As a 
consequence, one can argue that students should also be protected by the ideal of academic 
freedom.  But what specifically does this mean?  Academic freedom is a rather amorphous concept in 
general and this is especially so in relation to students rights; what is meant for example by the 
“freedom of study”?  Does it for instance permit a student carte blanche in relation to paper choice?   
Returning to the historical origins and untwining the intermingling of two distinct though related ideas 
may provide some clarity.  It seems clear that the term ‘academic freedom’ has been used to describe 
two concepts.  The first, concerning a narrower definition of academic freedom, addresses the right of 
individual scholars to challenge conventional wisdom without fear of reprisal or repression and 
arguably this freedom should apply to students.  The second, wider definition, addresses institutional 
autonomy, perhaps best described by Frankfurter J. in the 1957 US Supreme Court case of Sweezy v 
New Hampshire.
 xxix
 The Justice, in a concurring opinion, referred to the necessity for “the exclusion of 
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university” and described “‘the four essential 
freedoms’ of a university – to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study”.
xxx
 Institutional autonomy is not 
meant to address student rights and in determining the application of academic freedom to students it 
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is important not to merge the two ideas.  Accordingly, whilst there appear to be good grounds for 
including students within the rights protected by a narrow definition of academic freedom, there 
appears to be no historical, hitherto philosophical or political basis for including students in decisions 
as to “… what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study”.  This 
corresponds with the soft law documents mentioned above that assert a students rights to challenge 
data or views offered and even to select a field of study but, in contrast, do not suggest that a student 
should have the freedom to reject papers required for the completion of a degree course.   
5 ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR STUDENTS AS A LEGAL CONCEPT 
However, it is also important to distinguish between the concept of academic freedom as a 
philosophical construct or a rhetorical ideal as opposed to a working, defined legal right.  Has the dual 
freedom, encompassing the freedom to learn, been reflected in the law?  And if it has, what exactly 
does that freedom entail?  Clearly, the answers to these questions will depend upon the jurisdiction 
concerned and even a review of states that inherited a British tradition shows a divergence of modern 
day approaches to academic freedom in general.  In the United States in particular, the issue is 
controversial.
xxxi
  This paper however will address the legal situation in New Zealand for students.  
New Zealand is a unitary state.  The human rights of all persons legally in New Zealand are protected 
by the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘BORA’) and in particular, section 14 concerns the freedom of 
expression: “everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, 
and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form”.  The Bill of Rights Act does not have the 
status of a constitution but all statutes must be interpreted in a manner that accords with the rights set 
down in the Act.  As a result, any legislation must be interpreted in a manner that accords with section 
14, if possible; an important caveat on this protection is to be found in section 5.  Section 5 of BORA 
states that, “the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.  
Whilst a student may point to their right to free expression as supporting a freedom to reject 
mandatory papers, section 5 supplies an important dampener to this assertion particularly when one 
considers the specific legislation governing the tertiary sector.  
In New Zealand academic freedom is guaranteed by statute.  The Education Act 1989 attempts a 
definition of academic freedom, provides a legal right to that freedom and also addresses the status of 
students: 
 
s 161(2) … academic freedom, in relation to an institution, means – 
(a) the freedom of academic staff and students, within the law, to question and test received 
wisdom, to put forward new ideas and to state controversial or unpopular opinions: 
(b) the freedom of academic staff and students to engage in research… 
 
Thus, students are guaranteed their freedom to research, to critique and evaluate what is taught and 
to act as heterodox albeit within the specific confines set down in the Act.  This directly accords with 
section 14 of BORA.  But, student choice is absent from freedoms concerning curricula and the Act 
expressly refers to, 
 
S 161(2)(c) The freedom of the institutions and its staff to regulate the subject-matter of 
courses taught at the institution 
 
It is not possible to interpret this section in a manner that would accord with section 14 of BORA and a 
court would not attempt to do so: the Education Act makes ample provision for addressing BORA 
within section 161(2)(a)(b) and section 5 of BORA would operate to prevent a perverse interpretation 
of section 161(2)(c) of the Education Act.  Further, there are no affirmations in any other statutes or 
case-law permitting students freedom as to paper choice in a degree programme. 
Within other common law jurisdictions, what few cases there are on the rights of students to determine 
curricula, also suggests that this is not a freedom open to students.  In the US, for example, a federal 
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court rejected a Mormon theatre-studies student’s assertion that requiring her to speak words that she 
found offensive or that took the name of God or Christ in vain violated her First Amendment right to 
free speech or a right to religious freedom.
xxxii
 The student did not want to follow the set curriculum 
that, she argued, would have breached her legal rights.  The court, in part, used counterfactual 
reasoning and opined that if they found for the student then a believer in creationism could not be 
required to discuss and master the theory of evolution in a science class and a neo-Nazi could refuse 
to discuss, write or consider the Holocaust in a critical manner in a history class. Essentially, as the 
court found, curriculum choice fell within the judgement of faculty.  The appeal court agreed that courts 
should defer to faculty judgement as long as that curriculum requirement reasonably related to 
pedagogical concerns.
xxxiii
  To do otherwise would in the words of Ebel J, “give each student veto 
power over curriculum requirements, subjecting the curricular decisions of teachers to the whims of 
what a particular student does or does not feel like learning on a particular day”.
xxxiv
 The student’s 
constitutional right to free speech did not prove determinative.  The legal basis for this decision differs 
from the law in New Zealand but the counterfactual reasoning is directly transferable.  Clearly, from a 
practical perspective, it would make the management of degree programmes extremely difficult if 
students were able to reject mandatory papers on the basis of personal beliefs or choice.  
6 CONCLUSION 
It is possible to support the calls of academics for mandatory literacy papers in tertiary institutions by 
using jurisprudential reasoning.  Whilst it is possible to argue from a philosophical, and in New 
Zealand from a legal basis, that students’ have a right to academic freedom, that freedom guarantees 
the right of the student to test and openly critique received wisdom.  It does not permit a student the 
freedom to reject mandatory papers that may be justified for valid pedagogical concerns.  Further, in 
New Zealand the domestic law would support the imposition of mandatory papers on environmental 
literacy if that curriculum decision was to be made by a University and the courts would be likely to 
protect the reasonableness of any such decision from challenge.  It is likely that the law in a number of 
other common law jurisdictions would mirror this result although specific attention would have to be 
paid to the statutes, charitable documents or contracts establishing and governing the University 
before a categorical answer could be given. 
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